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ABSTRACT 
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), a “marriage” between public- and private-sector activity, 
have been employed for almost two decades as a “third way” to optimize the use of public funds 
and boost the quality of services traditionally provided by the public sector.  Their use has spread 
from the United Kingdom to Europe and beyond, and has expanded from the transport sector to 
innovative projects in health, education and others.  In Spain, successive governments have seized 
on PPPs as a solution to budget constraints at a time of dwindling EU aid and stricter fiscal 
targets.  As a result, the use of PPPs at all levels of government has exploded since 2003 and most 
recently culminated in a major infrastructure plan which relies on the private sector for 40% of  
its total investment.  Undoubtedly, this trend will bring benefits to the Spanish population in terms 
of more abundant, lower-cost and higher-quality services.  However, there are risks implicit in the 
way PPP is unfolding in Spain that could limit and even undo these benefits unless steps are taken 
to coordinate, monitor and follow up public-private projects and to communicate their virtues to 
the public.  Spain presents an interesting paradox in the history of PPP.  While it is one of 
Europe´s oldest, most active and most enthusiastic users of PPP, it is at the same time one of the 
countries that has demonstrated least interest at an official level in informing, monitoring, 
regulating and following up projects to ensure that their deepest benefits are being achieved.  
Relying on PPP only for private financing entails a risk that the benefits of PPP will not be 
realized and public services will actually become more expensive and less satisfactory over the 
medium and long term.  The Spanish government is advised to take steps similar to those taken in 
the United Kingdom, to ensure that PPP is managed correctly and hence becomes an asset and 
not a liability to Spanish citizens.   
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
ow can public services best be provided to a nation´s citizens?  The question is an old one that has 
become particularly pressing as governments have expanded and moved into new areas of activity.  
Much of the debate revolves around how the government can guarantee services to all citizens while 
minimizing costs and retaining incentives for high quality and on-time provision. 
 
The formula PPP first emerged in the United Kingdom as an answer to this question, in the wake of the 
conservative revolution of Margaret Thatcher.  Beginning in the early 1990s, the government began to explore 
avenues of co-production of public services with the private sector.  PFI, as it was called in the UK (Private 
Financing Initiative) spread quickly across sectors and took various forms, depending on the exact role that each 
project assigned to the private and public sectors.  The three main classifications that have emerged over time are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 
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Table 1:  PPP Project Types and Modalities 
 
Modality Type 
Type I:  Variants of design-build-finance-operate where the private 
sector designs, builds owns, develops, operates and manages an asset 
with no obligation to transfer ownership to the government 
 Build-Own Operate (BOO) 
 Build-develop-operate (BDO) 
 Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) 
Type II:  The private sector buys or leases an existing asset from the 
government renovates, modernizes and/or expands it and then operates 
the asset.  The private sector has no obligation to transfer ownership 
back to the government. 
 Buy-build-operate (BBO) 
 Lease-develop-operate (LDO) 
 Wrap-around-addition (WAA) 
Type III:  The private sector designs, builds and operates and then 
transfers the asset back to the government at some specified time.  
After transfer the private sector may rent or lease the asset from the 
government. 
 
 Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
 Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) 
 Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT) 
 Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT) 
 Build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
Adapted from:  International Monetary Fund, “Public-Private partnerships”, March 2004 
 
 
What is unique about PPP in contrast to privatizations or traditional public procurement is that both the 
private sector and the government retain a role in this “marriage” during the life of the project.  For the private 
sector, responsibility is not limited only to delivery of an asset, but to continuing provision of a service at acceptable 
quality levels over periods typically ranging up to 30 years.  For the government, PPPs mean a level of involvement 
well beyond that of privatizations or even subcontracting or outsourcing, as the two sectors become long-term 
partners in the provision of high-quality services.   
 
As PPP has broadened and expanded, a growing body of evidence has become available on what its 
benefits really are.  The advantages in terms of higher quality or more technologically advanced services are 
difficult to quantify.  In terms of costs and on-time delivery, the picture is clearer.  Two major surveys of PPP 
projects conducted by the British government
1
 estimated average savings of 17% on the completed projects, due 
mainly to the avoidance of cost overruns in the construction phase.  They also discovered that 80% of PPP projects 
had met their initial delivery time targets, compared to 20% for comparable public-sector projects
2
. The reports 
concluded that the main source of the savings was that risks of delays or overruns had effectively been transferred 
from the public to the private sector.  This effective reallocation of risks is the main benefit of PPPs and is the issue 
that must be addressed most effectively when PPP contracts are negotiated. 
 
In addition to cost savings, PPPs offer other financial benefits to the governments that use them as an 
alternative to traditional public procurement.  They allow governments to spread out the costs of a project and to pay 
for a service only as it is provided.  This additional flexibility and the savings detailed above usually more than 
outweigh the higher costs of private-sector financing of projects.  Beyond the financial benefits, PPPs also offer the 
obvious advantages of private-sector management and experience in designing, constructing and delivering services 
that are often complex and increasingly specialized, and outside the scope of public-sector experience.  An added 
plus is that private-sector suppliers who factor maintenance costs into a project (which is normally the case) are 
likely to plan and design projects more effectively. 
 
Besides the benefits outlined above, a striking lesson of the UK experience with PFI/PPP is that a new role 
for the public sector has emerged, piece by piece, as experience has progressed.  Rather than abdicating 
responsibility for the provision of public services, as it might have done with privatization, through PPP the 
government has become a long-term partner with the private sector and assumed new management responsibilities.  
Again, the UK was a pioneer in recognizing, defining and implementing these new governmental responsibilities.  It 
created a government unit dedicated to PPP that was active in providing advice to departments or governments that 
were contemplating private-sector involvement in public service delivery.  It developed the Public-Sector 
                                                 
1 NAO 2001 and HM Treasury 2003. 
2 HM Treasury, “PFI:  Meeting the Investment Challenge”, Crown Copyright, July 2003. 
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Comparator, an interactive model that enables potential users of PPP to compare the cost of a project by public and 
private-sector providers, so that rational decisions can be made
3
.  It drafted model contracts for different types of 
projects and encouraged small projects to consolidate under a single umbrella contract, to assist government units 
that had less experience with PPP and reduce the transaction costs involved in the bidding process.  It developed an 
exhaustive list of the PFI projects undertaken throughout the UK, which made available to the public all relevant 
information on each project
4
.  And it became active in following up projects in order to evaluate the performance of 
PPP and learn from its successes and failures.   
 
As PPP became widely accepted and spread to new sectors and countries, the need to provide these services 
and develop public-sector management skills became an international concern. The concern is especially pressing in 
countries undergoing major political and social change, such as developing countries and Eastern Europe.  The PPP 
unit of the United Nations Commission for Europe has been active in outlining the responsibilities that governments 
should assume for good governance of PPP projects.  Among these responsibilities are providing an adequate legal 
framework, informing citizens and maintaining transparent processes, ensuring a level playing field for potential 
bidders, avoiding corruption and defining and monitoring the performance of the private partners
5
.  (An extensive 
list of these responsibilities is included in Appendix 1 of this paper, in the form of a proposed “scorecard” of how 
well governments are managing PPP.) 
 
THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE WITH PPP 
 
Spain was not a newcomer to PPP when projects involving cooperation between the public and private 
sectors began to spread in size and variety at the end of the 1990s.  There are records of privately constructed 
highways in Spain in the 19
th
 century, and former dictator Francisco Franco used a simple form of BOT successfully 
in the 1970s to construct numerous toll highways.  It appeared natural for Spain to explore the PPP option under the 
conservative government that came to office in 1996, whose platform focused on deregulating and privatizing the 
economy.   
 
The first PPP projects in Spain in the 1990s were in the traditional transport sector, particularly highways.  
The volume of these projects soared at the end of the 1990s (see Figures 1, 2 and 3 below).  At the same time, their 
characteristics began to change:  they spread to new sectors, beginning with health; and the contracting party shifted 
from the national government to the many (17) regional governments in Spain´s decentralized system.  (see Figures 
4, 5 and 6 below)  In 2005, the regional governments monopolized the PPP market in Spain, and projects were being 
negotiated and signed in waste management, construction of public buildings and especially health.  In both volume 
and diversification, Spain in 2006 resembled the main EU countries that employed PPP; and it was a leading country 
in the EU in terms of project volume in 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 (Figures 7 and 8).
6
  Under the Infrastructure Plan 
unveiled by the PSOE in 2005, the government plans to obtain from the private sector 40% of a total financing of 
€241.4bn until the year 2020 for new and improved highways, railways, airports, ports and other infrastructures.  
This would be equivalent to about 0.5% of Spanish GDP per year until 2020, and would represent an unprecedented 
role for PPP in Spain that would make it a leader in Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Treasure Taskforce Private Finance, Technical Note nº 5:  How to Construct a Public Sector Comparator, October 1999, p. 
17.  An example of an interactive PSC developed by the Dutch government can be seen at http://www.minfin.nl/PPS. 
4 See this list at Project database Partnerships UK: http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/projectsdatabase/projectshome.html 
5 Governance in Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development (Draft), Economic Commission for Europe, 
Committee for Trade, Industry and Enterprise Development, Working Party on International Legal and Commercial Practice 
(WP.5), October 2005. 
6 European PPP Report 2005, DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary 
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Figure 1 
 
PPP Projects in Spain, by year (% of total project value 1996-present)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
P
en
d
in
g
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
PPP Projects in Spain, % of total number of projects
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Figure 3 
Value of PPP Projects as % Nominal GDP
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
PPP Projects in Spain by Sector and Year (% of total) 
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Figure 5 
 
PPP Projects in Spain by Sector to 2005
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Figure 6 
Entidad Contratante
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Figure 7 
PPP Projects Pending in EU Countries in 2005, by Sector (% total)
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Figure 8 
 
PPP Projects as % GDP in Selected EU Countries, 2003-2004
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What has driven this explosive development of PPP in Spain?  Undoubtedly, the Popular Party that 
governed Spain from 1996 to 2003 and currently governs many regions sympathizes with a view of PPP as the most 
efficient vehicle to deliver high-quality public services at lower cost, through the involvement of more efficient 
private sector partners. However, on an official level this view has not been clearly and publicly articulated.  This 
has led to confusion in the public debate over the meaning and content of PPP.  Under the Socialist party (PSOE) 
that took office in 2003, use of PPP at a national level has accelerated, and the public discussion mentions only the 
advantages of obtaining additional private-sector financing.   
 
It is significant that the surge in Spanish PPP projects coincides with 1) the Maastricht Treaty and the fiscal 
restraint demanded by its criteria for euro membership and 2) the expected drop in EU structural and cohesion funds 
to Spain following the enlargement of the European Union, which have been the source of financing for many 
Spanish infrastructure projects.  It seems fair to say that the main force –and possibly the only one-- propelling PPP 
in Spain over the past decade has been to obtain additional financing at a time of budget constraints and need for 
improved infrastructures and services. 
 
This exclusive emphasis on financing has conditioned the Spanish approach to managing PPP.  Rather than 
articulating a strategy and supporting it with specific guidelines to obtaining value for money and negotiating 
acceptable contracts, the government´s approach could be better described as a “hands off” search for private 
financing.  At the time of this report, a specific PPP unit still did not exist in the Spanish government, making it 
unique among the European Union countries.  Nor was there PPP-specific legislation, apart from the Infrastructure 
Law that was enacted in 2003 to regulate various aspects of privately funded projects.  The government has not 
made model contracts available to its different ministries or levels of government, and no public-sector comparator 
has been developed or adapted that could be used to determine whether using the PPP formula for a project offered 
potential value for money.  The Spanish government has not even made an official register of PPP projects available 
to citizens; in fact, the list given in Appendix 2, developed by the authors of this report, is the most comprehensive 
register developed in Spain.  And at the date of this report, there had been no comprehensive official follow-up made 
available to the public of the many PPP projects undertaken in Spain, along the lines of the surveys described above 
for the UK.  The Spanish government has relied almost exclusively on the market and private initiative to achieve 
the benefits of PPP for its citizens.  It shows little evidence of having accepted its role as active public manager and 
partner in a new formula of provision of public services, along the lines set out by the UK or the UNECE guidelines 
for PPP governance. 
 
What are the risks inherent in this approach to PPP, in contrast to the more “hands-on” British approach?  
Probably the main risk is that without a public-sector comparator or official support for negotiation of complex 
projects, there is no guarantee that PPP is the best alternative for provision of public services.  The experience of the 
UK and other countries has demonstrated that PPP is not appropriate for all projects; and that there are times when 
full public provision of services is a more efficient approach.  Choosing PPP without carefully contrasting the public 
and private costs for each project may turn out to be a more costly option for taxpayers and the final users of the 
services provided by PPP. 
 
Added to this risk is the danger that PPP projects that are not carefully monitored may not fulfill the 
expected quality standards, or may experience cost overruns that are charged back to the public sector or to the final 
user.  The Spanish bidding process has been characterized by fierce competition for projects, which often result in 
aggressive pricing and discounts of up to 30% over the initial projected cost
7
.  It seems evident that Spanish 
companies are eager to win these projects, which guarantee annual streams of income over long periods, and are 
willing to slash prices in order to do so.  However, the implicit risk in awarding a contract to an underpricing bidder 
is that if the offer is too low and the company cannot cover costs, it will either deliver a lower-quality service than 
initially expected or pressure the government to renegotiate the contract at a higher price.  Either option short-
circuits the benefits from PPP. 
                                                 
7 Since the government does not maintain an official project register available to the public and details of biddings are not always 
publicly available, this is not an official figure but an estimate by Tecniberia-Asince, an industry association of engineering and 
consulting firms. 
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The fact that Spain does not yet perform comprehensive follow-up or even maintain a central register of 
PPP projects underlines another risk inherent in the “hands-off” approach:  that PPP projects may not be delivering 
value for money over the medium and long term, and the government is missing valuable opportunities to review its 
experience, correct errors and learn from its mistakes.  As PPP activity decentralizes and accelerates at regional and 
local levels of government, authorities entering into complex negotiations may be doing so without the tools that are 
necessary to guarantee that the projects deliver value for money.  Again, the risk inherent in this approach is either 
renegotiation at higher prices in the future, lower quality services or the inviability of projects over the medium and 
longer term. 
 
Finally, in Spain there has been no official effort to inform the public on the motives for PPP and its 
potential benefits.  In contrast to the efforts for transparency and effective communication of objectives and results 
in the UK, very little public relations effort has been associated with PPP in Spain at any level of government.  The 
risk inherent in this failure to articulate and communicate a role for PPP is that employees involved in new projects 
or final users who do not see the benefits of private-sector provision may begin to voice their opposition to PPP.  
This would raise the risk of private investment in PPP projects, which could mean lower investor interest in new 
projects and higher costs.  Again, the ultimate risk is that PPP will not deliver its potential benefits to taxpayers and 
users in Spain. 
 
What can be done to avoid these risks?  In light of the international experience and the particular 
characteristics of Spain´s history with PPP, the following changes would be important steps forward to guide the 
process in Spain: 
 
1. A clear and specific framework should be elaborated for the PPP bidding process in Spain.  This should 
include not only laws, which are largely adequate, but a public-sector comparator, model contracts for 
complex projects and steps to ensure that the playing field in Spain remains level and open to foreign 
bidders. 
2. A PPP unit must be created at the national level to monitor, oversee and review projects, to ensure that their 
potential benefits are realized and communicated to the public. 
3. The public sector must accept its management or “governance” role in PPP, along the lines envisaged by 
the UNECE or demonstrated by the governments of the UK and other countries that have utilized PPP. 
4. A strategic vision for PPP that crosses party lines should be elaborated by the government and 
communicated clearly to citizens.  This would ensure continued support for projects and lend security to 
potential investors into the longer term. 
 
PPP can be an asset or a potential liability to the governments that use it, depending on how successfully 
they are managed.  Spain faces a significant public management challenge as PPP activity surges in all sectors and at 
all levels, and the way it responds to the challenge will determine whether PPP delivers its proven benefits to 
Spanish citizens in the form of lower-cost, higher-quality public services. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
UNECE Scorecard For Successful Governance Of PPP Projects By The Public Sector 
 
                    
Benchmarking Score 
Transparency 1 2 3 4 5 
  Participation of citizens   
    Consumers' organizations  
      involvement in projects            
      Media exposure           
      Proposal of projects by civil society and/or NGOs           
    Use of constitutional tools for decision-making process   
      inclusion of referendum in the Constitution           
      regularity of its use           
      level of citizens' awareness of its existence and purpose           
  Public Procurement   
    Selective procedure  
      General applicable law for all tender processes           
      Specific laws according to the sector           
      Harmonized rules under regional unification initiatives            
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      Corporate governance requirements           
      Award procedure           
      Tender appeal procedure           
    Open Participation and non-discrimination   
      Companies whose headquarters are not based in the country are successful in tender processes           
      Early publication of tender offers in local and international newspapers            
      Open competition rules           
      Level playing field           
    Good negotiation platform   
      Expertise and dedication of negotiators           
      Independence of judgment            
      Defined goals and objectives in the negotiation process           
    Coordination   
      
Special governmental agency in charge of coordinating the project proposals and 
commencement of tender process 
          
      Web site information and on-line pre-registration           
    Organized data gathering    
      Centralized database with possible and actual contractors           
      Due diligence on the bidders' financial and technical performances           
    Contractors' registry   
      Qualification of contractors according to specific standards           
      Contractors' updated profile           
      Regular advertisement of status of contractors           
    Due authorization to grant permits, concessions or licenses    
      Legal delegation of authority to officials to sign on behalf of the government           
      Regulation about permits and/or licenses at a national level           
      Divulgation of information about granted permits, licenses and/or concessions           
  Strong anti-corruption measures   
    International level  
      Anti-bribery Convention           
        Ratification of the OECD Convention           
        Implementation of its requirements           
        Proposals in international for anti-corruption measures            
        Participation in specialized inter-governmental organisms for combating corruption           
    National level   
      Enforcement measures  
        Criminal law reforms           
      Anti-corruption independent Agency   
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        Independency from all three powers (public, private and facilitators)           
        Publication of reports on corruption issues           
        Divulgation of information and reports           
        Educational programs            
      Criminal prosecution   
        Rate of prosecuted cases            
        Rate of sentences imposing imprisonment and economic penalties on defendants           
  PPP unit   
    Creation of legislation  
      Amount of projects presented to Legislative body           
      Amount of proposed bills passed by Legislative Body           
    Existence of specialists taskforce   
      Diversity of specialists backgrounds           
      Independency           
    Identification of projects   
      Updated database of possible projects           
      Frequent contacts with private sector and civil society           
      Project "hunting"           
      Private initiatives and/or unsolicited offers           
    Right to challenge   
      number of times used           
      results           
    Education and dissemination of information   
      Special programs at different levels to disseminate information on PPPs           
      Access to media           
      Publications           
      Organization of conferences, seminars and/or workshops on related topics           
    Issuance of guidelines and advisory notes   
      Publication           
      Advertisement           
    Measure of performance   
      Ad campaign           
      Elaborate web page           
      Amount of consults registered in the website           
      Amount of people who know of the existence and assigned tasks of the Unit           
  Dispute Resolution   
    Contractual level  
      Easy dispute mechanism on interpretation and application of clauses  
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        Frequency            
        Clear arbitration clause            
        Choice of law clauses           
        Existence of a choice of forum clause           
    Post-contractual period   
      conflict prevention  
        Flexibility           
        Consultation with independent experts           
        Use of mediation           
        Permanent team of experts assigned to solve conflicts           
      Participation of consumers   
        Extended use of class action           
        Instauration of consultation procedures           
        Performance of Ombudsman           
    
Public accountability   
  Public servants' responsibility  
    Awareness for the consequences of their decisions  
      Appointment based on merits and open election           
      Presentation of personal financial statements           
      Definition of civil torts regarding public officials' performance            
      Criminal and civil prosecution for irregularities on PPPs projects           
      Level of citizens' scrutiny and participation in the appointment process           
  Accounting and auditing            
    Clear accounting treatment of assets involved in PPPs    
      Off-balance sheet allocation            
      Definition of ownership of assets           
      Risk assessment            
      Risk assumption by the private sector           
    Independent auditing    
      Participation of independent auditing firms selected by transparent, open procurement.           
      Independent permanent auditor assigned to the project and/or SPV           
      Reports directly to PPP unit           
  Performance of private company   
    Performance and output milestones definition  
      Stepped or banded thresholds           
      Involvement of experts in stepped or banded thresholds analysis            
      Trigger of payments based on performance assessments           
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  Tax   
    Tax advantages  
      Tax reduction according to investment           
      Progressive elimination of tax burdens           
      Elimination of double-taxation irregularities           
    
Sustainable development  
  Long-term infrastructure goals  
    Inclusion of PPP policy in national program  
      Creation of PPP Unit           
      Legislation           
      Assignment of PPP projects in national and/or state budget           
      Outline of comprehensive national infrastructure projects           
      Clear definition of sectorial goals            
      Special treatment to problematic and/or urgent national infrastructure needs           
    Annual plans and programmes   
      Publication of plans           
      Access to media           
      Education programs at all levels (primary, secondary and university)           
  Feasibility studies    
    Technical           
    Financial            
    Profitability study            
  Commercial development    
    Sustainability   
      Compromise of private sector for long-term projects           
      Financial performance of private sector in social infrastructure            
      Public control           
    Value for money   
  Contracts  
    Good design of agreements  
      Broad choice of contracts that better suit the needs of the project           
      Creative definition of covenants           
      Flexibility during the life of the contract           
  Publicity and Education   
    Expansion of knowledge on PPPs  
      Diversification            
      Level of understanding of citizens about the key elements of a PPP project           
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      Access to media           
      Polls among users and consumers on performance of the private company           
      Polls to measure public's satisfaction with the service           
  Safety and Security   
    Specialized Safety and Security agency  
      Performance            
      Instauration of preventive measures           
      Level of spread of information related to security measures           
      Periodic exams in the project           
    Strong insurance policy    
      Regulation of insurance market           
      Existence of covenants in agreements           
  
Source: Governance in Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development (Draft), Economic Commission for Europe, 
Committee for Trade, Industry and Enterprise Development, Working Party on International Legal and Commercial Practice 
(WP.5), October 2005.  
 
 
Appendix 2 
PPP projects in Spain 
 
Nombre del 
proyecto 
Sector CCAA Dependencia 
Valor 
en 
€M 
Fecha   Concesionario 
Estado del 
proyecto 
Notas 
Alicante - 
Cartagena 
Carreteras 
Valencia / 
Murcia 
Estado  1998 (a) Ausur En servicio 
77 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Tarragona - 
Valencia A-7 
Carreteras 
Valencia / 
Cataluña 
Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Aumar En Servicio 
225 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Valencia-Losa del 
Obispo, CV-35 
Carreteras Valencia CCAA 450 2005 (a) 
UTE Sacyr-
Nagares-Secopsa 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción -
450 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Variante de 
Alicante 
Carreteras Valencia Estado 445 2004 (a) Ciralsa 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
445 M€ 
Hospital Valencia  
- Alcira 
Sanidad Valencia CCAA 123 
1999 (en 
servicio) 
Ribera Salud, 
UTE - Aldesas 
En Servicio 
Valor de 
Construcción 
123 M€ 
Hospital Denia Sanidad Valencia CCAA 97 2005 UTE - DKV 
En 
Construcción 
Valor de 
Construcción 
97 M€ 
Hospital Torrevieja Sanidad Valencia CCAA 70 2004 
UTE - Necso y 
Enrique Ortiz e 
Hijos 
En 
Construcción 
Valor de 
Construcción 
70 M€ 
Hospital de 
Manises-Quart 
Sanidad Valencia CCAA  2005 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
 
Valencia - Alicante Carreteras Valencia Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Aumar En servicio 
149 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Hospital Son 
Dureta 
Sanidad 
Palma de 
Mallorca 
CCAA 778 2005 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
778 M€ 
(licitación) 
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Palma - Manacor Carreteras 
Palma de 
Mallorca 
CCAA 116 abr-04 
Sacyr 
Vallehermoso y 
las sociedades 
mallorquinas 
Melchor 
Mascaró, 
Aglomsa, Matías 
Arrom Biblioni, 
Electro 
Hidráulica y 
Obras y 
Pavimentos Man 
En 
construcion 
 116  inversion 
prevista - Peaje 
en Sombra 
Túnel de Soller Carreteras 
Palma de 
Mallorca 
Estado  1990 Tunel de soller En servicio 
3 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Autopista Eibar - 
Vitoria 
Carreteras 
País Vasco / 
Navarra 
CCAA 721 
Varios tramos - 
EIB funding 
close Abril 2005 
BIDEGI, SA, 
Vias de Alava, 
SA 
En 
Construccion 
Valor de 
construcción - 
721 M€ 
Bilbao -Zaragoza Carreteras 
País Vasco / 
Aragón 
Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Avasa En servicio 
294 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Bilbao - Behobia Carreteras País Vasco Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Concesión 
terminó en 2003 
En servicio 
115 km, Peaje 
(BOT), ahora 
tiene contratos 
de servicio bajo 
el gobierno 
local 
Tudela - Irurzun Carreteras País Vasco Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Audenasa En servicio 
113 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Túnel de Artxanda Carreteras País Vasco Estado  1998 Artxanda Tuneles En servicio 
5 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Pamplona-Estella-
Logroño  Autovia 
de Caminos 
Carreteras 
Navarra / La 
Rioja 
CCAA 324 2000/2001 (a) 
Autovía del 
Camino, S.A. 
En 
construcción 
con varios 
tramos 
abiertos 
Valor de 
construcción - 
324 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Medinaceli-Soria-
Tudela 
Carreteras 
Navarra / 
Castilla y 
León 
Estado 631  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
631 M€ 
Zona regable del 
Canal de Navarra 
Agua Navarra CCAA 408  Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
aprobación 
Inversion total 
600M€ 
Cartagena - Vera Carreteras 
Murcia / 
Andalucía 
Estado 526  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
526 M€ 
Segovia-San Rafael Carreteras 
Madrid / 
Castilla y 
León 
Estado 102 2001 
Castellana de 
Autopistas/Iberpi
stas  
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
102 M€, Peaje 
Madrid - Ocaña, R-
4 
Carreteras 
Madrid / 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Estado 598 2000 (a) 
Autopista 
Madrid-Sur 
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
598 M€, Peaje 
Madrid - 
Guadalajara R-2 
Carreteras 
Madrid / 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Estado 409 2000 (a) Henarsa En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
409 M€, Peaje 
Madrid - Toledo  Carreteras 
Madrid / 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Estado 400  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
400 M€, Peaje 
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M-30  Carreteras Madrid CCAA 2458 
2003 (a); varios 
tramos 
Varios Tramos - 
OHL, 
CORSAN/CORV
IAM, UTE 
SANDO/PLODO
, ALDESA, UTE 
Ortiz/Ogensa, 
SACYR, UTE 
NEXO/Ferrovial, 
UTE 
Dragados/FCC,  
En 
construcción 
Valor de 
construcción - 
2458 M€ 
Madrid-Arganda y 
Madrid - 
Navalcarnero, R-3 
y R-5 
Carreteras Madrid Estado 841 1999 
Amsa - Accesos 
madrid 
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
841 M€, Peaje 
M-45 Various 
Tramos 
Carreteras Madrid CCAA 487 
1998; varios 
tramos 
Concesiones de 
Madrid, 
Autopista 
Trados-45, 
Autopista 
Trados-45 
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
487 M€, Peaje 
en sombra 
Autopista Eje 
Barajas 
Carreteras Madrid Estado 328 2002 (a) Eje Aeropuerto 
En 
construcción 
Valor de 
construcción - 
328 M€, Peaje 
Majahonda 
Hospital 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 256  Bovis Lend Lease 
En 
construcción 
Valor de 
construcción 
256 M€ 
Ruta de Pantanos  
M-503 
Carreteras Madrid CCAA 100,7 1999 (a) Acciona En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
100,7 M€, 
Peaje en 
Sombra 
Hospital - 
Valdebernado Sur 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 98,7 2005 
Begar y Ploder en 
consorcio con 
Idissa, Vectrinsa, 
Fuensanta y 
Cantoblanco 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
98.7 M€ 
Hospital - San 
Sebastián de los 
Reyes 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 98,2 2005 
Acciona, S.A y 
Crespo y Blasco, 
S.A 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
98.2 M€ 
Tranvía de Parla Transporte Madrid CCAA 93,5 2005 (a) 
UTE que han 
FCC y Acciona 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción -
93,5 M€ 
M-407, en 
Fuenlabrada 
Carreteras Madrid CCAA 70,3 2005 (a) 
FCC 
Construcción 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción -
70,3 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Hospital - Jarma - 
Coslada 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 66,7 2005 
Sacyr, S.A, Testa 
Inmuebles en 
Renta, S.A. y 
Valoriza 
Facilities, S.A.U 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
66.7 M€ 
Hospital - Los 
Conejeras 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 64,4 2005 
Sacyr, S.A., Testa 
Inmuebles en 
Renta, S.A. y 
Valoriza 
Facilities, S.A.U 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
64.4 M€ 
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Hospital - 
Valdecipreste 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 49,3 2005 FCC 
Construcción y 
OHL aliados 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
49.3 M€ 
Hospital - Montaña 
de Aranjuez 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 43,3 2005 
Sando, Hispánica 
y la empresa de 
instalaciones 
Inabensa 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción 
43.3 M€ 
Hospital 
Valdemoro 
Sanidad Madrid CCAA 132 2005 adjudicacon Capio y Ghesa 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
132 M€ 
inversión  
M-203 Madna Carreteras Madrid CCAA 131 No Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
131 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Tenerife Tranvia Rail Las Canarias CCAA 226 2004 
Metropolitano de 
Tenerife 
En 
construcción 
228 M€ 
la autovía del 
Barbanza 
Carreteras Galicia CCAA 109  Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Limite de 
licitación - 109 
M€, Peaje en 
Sombra 
Santiago-Brión Carreteras Galicia CCAA 103,2 2005 (a) 
UTE - Dragados, 
Extraco y F. 
Gómez 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
103,2 M€, 
Peaje en 
Sombra 
La Autovía del 
Salnés 
Carreteras Galicia CCAA 40,6 2005 (a) 
Copasa, Puentes 
y Calzadas y 
Caixanova 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
40,6 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
A Coruna - 
Carballo AG-55 
Carreteras Galicia CCAA  1995 
Autoestradas de 
Galicia 
En servicio  
Puxeiros - Val 
Miñor AG-57 
Carreteras Galicia CCAA  1995 
Autoestradas de 
Galicia 
En servicio  
Ferrol - Frontera 
Portugal 
Carreteras Galicia Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Audasa En servicio 
219 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Santiago de 
Compostela - Alto 
de Santo Domingo 
Carreteras Galicia Estado  
1999 (a); 3 
tramos 
Acega En servicio 
57 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Centro de mayores Tercera Edad Extremadura CCAA 9 2005 (a) 
INVERBLOIS, 
S.L 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
un derecho de 
superficie de 
8.795 m2 (dos 
parcelas 
municipales) a 
75 años 
Vic-Ripoll Carreteras Cataluña CCAA 220,6 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Valor de 
construcción - 
220,6 M€, 
Peaje en 
Sombra 
Vilanova -Manresa Carreteras Cataluña CCAA 181,7 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Valor de 
construcción - 
181,7 M€, 
Peaje en 
Sombra 
Macanet - Platja 
d'Aro (Baix 
Empordà) 
Carreteras Cataluña CCAA 61  Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Valor de 
construcción - 
61 M€, Peaje en 
Sombra 
Hospital del Baix 
Llobregat 
Sanidad Cataluña CCAA 55 2005 (a) 
Acsa Agbar 
Construcción, 
Emte, Teyco y 
'La Caixa' 
En 
Construcción 
55 M€ 
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Reus-Alcover, Carreteras Cataluña CCAA 51,4 2005 (a) 
Dragados 
Concesiones de 
Infraestructuras-
Benito Arnó e 
Hijos SA  
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
construcción - 
51,4 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Barcelona - La 
Jonquera A-7 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
150 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Barcelona 
(Granollers) - 
Montmelo C-33 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
14,1 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Barcelona - 
Tarragona A-7 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
100 kn, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Castelldefels - El 
Vendrell 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  1992 / 1998 (i) Aucat 2 tramos En servicio 
58 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Montgat - Palafolls Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
49 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Montmelo - El 
Papiol A-7 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
26,8 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Terrassa - 
Manresa/Sant 
Cugat 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
1989 (en 
servicio) 
Autema En servicio 
43 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Tunel del Cadi Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Túnel de cadi En servicio 
30 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Túneles de 
Vallvidrera 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Tabasa En servicio 
17 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Zaragoza - 
Mediterráneo A-2 
Carreteras Cataluña Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Acesa En servicio 
215 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Eje Llobregat Carreteras Cataluña CCAA 240 
Adjudicación 
2005 
FCC/ COPISCA/ 
CORNSA/ 
COPISA 
 
240 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Cuitat de la Justicia Las Cortes Cataluña CCAA 263 2005 Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
263 M€ 
Tranvía Barcelona 
Baix Llobregat 
Rail Cataluña CCAA 217 2000 
Tramvia 
Metropolità 
En servicio 217 M€ 
Tranvía Barcelona 
Besós 
Rail Cataluña CCAA 212 
2002 
adjudicación 
FCC- Connex En Servicio 212 M€ 
Burgos - Armiñón Carreteras 
Castilla y 
León / País 
Vasco 
Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Europistas En servicio 
84 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Conexión A1/A68 
Haro-Pancorbo 
Carreteras 
Castilla y 
León / La 
Rioja 
Estado 99  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
99 M€ 
Leon - 
Campomanes 
Carreteras 
Castilla y 
León / 
Asturias 
Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Aucalsa En servicio 
78 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Valladolid-Segovia Carreteras 
Castilla y 
León 
CCAA 196 2006 (a) 
Dos Tramos - 
Dragados, 
Cyopsa y Caja 
Duero - Sacyr 
Vallehermoso y 
Construcciones 
Lerma 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
196 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Hospital de Burgos Sanidad 
Castilla y 
León 
CCAA 163,8  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
Valor de 
Construcción 
163,8 M€ 
Autopista Léon - 
Astorga 
Carreteras 
Castilla y 
León 
Estado 110 1999 Avelesa En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
110 M€, Peaje 
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Adanero -Villalba Carreteras Castilla y 
León 
Estado Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Iberpistas En servicio 28 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
Toledo-Ciudad 
Real 
Carreteras 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Estado 1382  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
1382 M€ 
Ocaña - La Roda Carreteras 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
Estado 525 2004 (a) 
Autopistas 
Madrid-levante 
En 
Construcción 
Valor de 
construcción - 
525 M€, Peaje 
Mantenimiento de 
carreteras Toledo 
Zona 1 
Carreteras 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
CCAA 36,2 2006 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
mantenimiento 
Mantenimiento de 
carreteras Toledo 
Zona 2 
Carreteras 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
CCAA 27,1 2007 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
mantenimiento 
Mantenimiento de 
carreteras Toledo 
Zona 3 
Carreteras 
Castilla La 
Mancha 
CCAA 34,1 2008 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
mantenimiento 
Autovía los 
Viñedos Tramo 1 
Suegra Tomelloso 
Carreteras 
Castilla - La 
Mancha 
CCAA 170 2003 (a) 
Construcciones 
Sarrión, 
Construcciones 
Gismero y Caja 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
En 
construcción 
Valor de 
construcción - 
170 M€, Valor 
total 295 Peaje 
en sombra 
Autovía los 
Viñedos Tramo 2 
Toledo (Mora) 
Suegra 
Carreteras 
Castilla - La 
Mancha 
CCAA 136 2003 (a) 
Dragados y 
Cyopsa 
 
Valor 
construcción 
136, Valor total 
332 M€, Peaje 
en sombra 
Centro de residuos Residuos Cantabria CCAA 39 2005 Urbaser 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
39 M€ 
Ibiza Sun Antonio Carreteras Balearas CCAA 70 No Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
70 M€, Peaje en 
Sombra 
Oviedo - Porceyo Carreteras Asturias CCAA 129  Sin determinar 
Pendiente 
adjudicación 
Limite de 
licitación - 129 
M€, Peaje en 
Sombra 
Oviedo y Gijón Carreteras Asturias CCAA 121 2005 (a) 
Sacyr 
Vallehermoso 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
Valor de 
construcción - 
121 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Autopista de Ebro Carreteras Aragón CCAA 118 Fin 2005 (a) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
adjudicación 
Valor de 
construcción -
80-118 M€, 
Peaje en 
Sombra 
El Burgo de Ebro y 
Villafranca de Ebro 
Carreteras Aragon CCAA 85 
Adudicacion 
2005 dec 
Acciona-Brues y 
Fernández CC y 
Arascon 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
 85 M€, Peaje 
en Sombra 
Alto de las pedrizas Carreteras 
Andalucía 
(Malaga) 
Estado 421 2005 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato  
limite licitación 
-421 M€ 
Ferrocarril Costa 
del Sol 
Transporte Andalucía CCAA 2337  Sin determinar  2337 M€ 
Málaga-Estepona Carreteras Andalucía Estado 481 1996 
autopista del sol - 
Ausol 
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
481 M€, Peaje 
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Metro Sevilla Transporte Andalucía CCAA 428,5 2004 DRAGADOS, 
SACYR, 
RUSVEL, GEA 
21, CAF y 
TUZSA 
En 
construcción 
428, 5 M€ 
Metro Malaga line 
1 & 2 
Transporte Andalucía CCAA 403 2004 
UTE - FCC, 
Comsa, Sando, 
AZVI, 
Construcciones 
Vera y Caja 
Rural 
Intermediterránea 
En 
construcción 
403 M€ 
Granada Metro Transporte Andalucía CCAA 280 2005 (l) Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
280 M€ 
Estepona Guadiaro Carreteras Andalucía Estado 180 1999 
autopista del sol - 
Ausol 
En servicio 
Valor de 
construcción - 
180 M€, Peaje 
Metro Malaga line 
3 
Transporte Andalucía CCAA 178  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
178 M€ 
Train Chiclana - 
San Fernando 
Transporte Andalucía CCAA 116,4 2003 (a)  Sin determinar 
Pendiente el 
contrato 
116.4 M€ (con 
extensión 
Cádiz) 
Tram Vélez - Torre 
del Mar 
Transporte Andalucía CCAA 18,8 2003 (a)  
Alsina Graells, 
Sando 
Construcciones y 
Continental Rail 
En 
construcción 
18.8 M€ 
Sevilla - Cadiz Carreteras Andalucía Estado  
Anterior a 1975 
(c) 
Aumar En servicio 
94 km, Peaje 
(BOT) 
 
 
NOTES 
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NOTES 
